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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IRENE ERICKSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

t
(

vs.

Case No.
10914

ORAN L. BEARDALL,
)
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Respondent filed an action against the Appellant
alleging that pursuant to a divorce between the parties,
the Appellant and Respondent entered into a stipulation whereby Appellant agreed to pay certain obligations. That Appellant failed to pay said obligations.
That thereafter, Appellant filed a voluntary petition
in Bankruptcy. Respondent further alleged that the
obligations set forth in the stipulation were not dis1

chargeable in bankruptcy as arising out of an alimony
and maintenance provision of a divorce decree and
thus not a provable debt in bankruptcy.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court and from a verdict
and judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in his
favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August, 1965, the Appellant commenced a proceeding for divorce against the Respondent. On September 2, 1965, Respondent through counsel informed
the appellant's counsel of the terms under which a setlement of the divorce action could be effected. Thereafter in September, 1965 the Appellant and Respondent executed a stipulation wherein Appellant agreed
to execute a promissory note to the Respondent in the
amount of $1,265.85 and agreed among other things,
to pay a joint obligation to First Federal Savings and
Loan Association in the amount of $1379.83, an obligation owed to Zions First National Bank in the amount
of $2043.10 and an obligation owed to City Finance
Company of Murray in the amount of $471.64, and
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T
to pay Respondent $100.00 per month as alimony until
her social security was reinstated.
Thereafter on the 27th day of October, 1965 the
Court made and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and a Decree awarding the Divorce Decree
to the Appellant and approving the stipulation of the
parties regarding alimony and property matters.

I

(

I
I

That in July 1966, Appellant was in the process
of filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. That prior
to such filing the Appellant did transfer to the Respondent a 1964 Dodge Truck in satisfaction of the
promissory note set forth in the stipulation and executed in the favor of the Respondent in the amount
of $1265.85. That thereafter on the 28th day of July,
1966, the Appellant did file a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy and did thereafter discontinue any payments upon the obligations set forth in the stipulation
approved by the Court in the Divorce Decree, Civil No.
28806.
On August 5, 1966, the Respondent :filed a complaint to collect the amount due under the promissory
note and praying for judgment against the defendant
for the amounts owed to First Federal Savings and
Loan Association, City Finance Company of Murray,
and Zions First National Bank. Appellant filed a
motion for stay of proceedings asking the Court to
stay the proceedigs pending the completion of the bankruptcy hearings and the Court granted said stay of
proceedings on the 20th day of September, 1966 al-
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lowing Respondent 20 days to amend her complaint
to show an avoidance of discharge in bankruptcy if
she desired. Thereafter on the 7th of October, 1966,
Respondent filed her amended complaint alleging that
the obligations arose out of an alimony and maintenance provision of a Divorce Decree and were not dischargeable in bankruptcy and praying for judgment
against the Appellant for the amounts set forth in the
complaint.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND
THE APPLICABLE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT
THE OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST FEDERAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, CITY
FINANCE COMPANY OF MURRAY, AND
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK ARE FOR
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE
RESPONDENT AND THEREFORE N 0 T
DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY.
POINT II
THE OBLIGATIONS SUED UPON BY
THE RESPONDENT WERE CONTRACTUAL
IN NATURE AND THE COURT ERRED
WHEN IT FOUND THAT SUCH OBLIGA-

4

TIONS WERE FOR SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE RESPONDENT. THAT
SUCH OBLIGATIONS WERE DISCHARGED
BY THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

I
l

TIIE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND
THE APPLICABLE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT
THE OBLIGATIONS TO FIRST FEDERAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, CITY
FINANCE COMPANY OF MURRAY, AND
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK ARE FOH
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE
RESPONDENT AND THEREFORE N 0 1.'
DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY.

I

In asserting her claim against Appellant, Respondent relies upon Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act,
Title 11, Bankruptcy, Section 35, U.S.C.A., which
provides:

I

I

"Debts not effected by a discharge. a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt
from all of his provable debts whether allowable
in full or in part, except such as (I) . . . ; ( 2)
. . . or for alimony due or to become due, or for
maintenance or support of wife or child, ... "
Thus, the burden of proof upon Respondent was
to establish proof by a preponderance of the evidence
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that the debts owed to First Federal Savings and
Loan Association, Zions First National Bank and City
Finance Company of Murray were the obligation of
the Appellant in order to provide for the support and
maintenance of the Respondent.
The record disclosed that at the time of the trial
the Plaintiff-Respondent had remarried (TR p. 5, lines
I to 3):
(Mr. Hinton) "Q You have remarried, have
you not, since this complaint has been filed?"
(Irene Erickson) "A
Robison."

Yes.

The name is

It further discloses the purpose of the parties in
having the Appellant, Mr. Beardall, enter into an
agreement and stipulation for the payment of certain
debts to aggregate the amount of funds the Respondent had brought into the marriage. (TR p. 5, lines 19
through 26):
(Mr. Hinton) "Q Did you have any funds
at the time you married Mr. Beardall?"
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A

Yes."

(Mr. Hinton) "Q Can you tell the Court
how much?"
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A Nearly $5,000.00. $4,700.00 and some odd dollars."
(Mr. Hinton) "Q And did you have any of
those funds at the time of the divorce?"
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A
and (TR p. 26, lines 14 to 22):
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No."

(Mr. Jeffs) "Q Now, if I understood you
correctly, the purpose of the stipulation and of
the transfer of these various properties, and of
Mr. Beardall's assuming the obligations on these
three debts, was to reimburse you for funds that
you had at the time that you went into the marriage?"
(Irene Erickson Ro bison) "A

Yes."

(Mr. Jeffs) "Q To replace or in effect to
replace the property that you had prior to your
going into the marriage?"
(Irene Erickson Robison) "A

Yes."

The fact that the assumption of the obligations
set forth in the stipulation in the divorce proceedings
which was received as evidence (TR p. 47, lines 25 to
30 and p. 48, lines l and 2) to reimburse Mrs. Robison
for funds she had prior to the marriage is further established by Mr. Hinton's letter of September 2, 1965
(Exhibit 5-D) :
"Mrs. Beardall had in her bank account the
sum of $4,734.36 at the time of their marriage.
This has all been spent primarily on Mr. Beardall's bills a.vd for automobiles. If we were to figure interest at four per ce~t on this amount
without the interest being compounded for the
seven months in 1963 in which they were married,
all of 1964 and for the first eight months of this
year, the total interest would be $426.06. This
added to the original amount would make $5,160.42.

There are three accounts on which money is
owed and which Mr. Beardall agreed that he
should pay. One of these was for siding on the
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house for $1,379.83, for the 1965 Valiant automobile, $2,043.10 and $471.64 to City Finance.
This amount totals to $3,894.57. If that figure
is subtracted from the total amount she should
have coming, it would leave a balance of $1,265.85."

The promissory note in the sum of $1,265.85 (Exhibit 4-P) was executed to make up the difference between the sum of the three obligations assumed by Mr.
Beardall and the amount claimed by Mrs. Robison
together with interest as necessary to reimburse her for
the funds brought to the marriage.
Respondent claims the assumption of these debts
was for her support and maintenance. However, the
court will note from an examination of the file in the
divorce proceeding that the divorce was granted to
Appellant herein. Under such circumstance, the court
in the divorce matter would not be obliged to provide
for the support of the offending party. In this divorce
the parties resolved that matter by providing in their
stipulation and agreement that Mr. Beardall should
pay Mrs. Robison $100.00 per month until her social
security was reinstated, which he did. (TR p. 16, lines
17 to 20 and p. 28, lines 17 to 23).
The dischargeability of debts and obligations of
parties to a divorce under a property settlement agreement or a support and maintenance agreement is discussed by various texts and treatises as well as in the
case law.
An annotation in 104 A.L.R. at p. 722 collects
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and groups the cases construing and applying the provision of the Bankruptcy Act excepting debts for
maintenance or support of wife and child from discharge. Therein the annotator cites several cases holding that agreements entered into prior to divorce wherein the husband agrees to pay payments to the wife
which will continue after the divorce are held to be
support matters and not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act. However, the annotator goes on to say
at page 724:
"The exception of the Bankruptcy Act under
consideration does not, however, extend to all
claims for maintenance or support."
Under this portion of the annotation the annotator is
quoted as follows:
"In Re Ostrander ( 1905; D. C.) 139 F. 592,
Am. Bankr. Rep. 96, it was held that the provision of the Bankruptcy Act exempting from
discharge liabilities for maintenance or support
of wife or child did not include a debt incurred
by the husband for the services of a physician to
attend the wife while she was in a normal relationship to her husband. The court said: "If so,
a person supplying goods for a wife or child,
or rendering a service necessary for support or
maintenance, at the request of the husband,
without delinquency on his part, would be beyond the scope of the act. The grocer, the marketman, clothiers of all descripton, physicians,
dentists,-in fact all who, by service or sale, contribute to the support of the family and whereby
to the support of a wife or child,-would have
claims not dischargeable under the act."
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"In Loman v. Locke (1921) 240 Mass. 551,
134 N.E. 343, 48 Am. Bankr. Rep. 198, it was
held that a judgment for board, clothing, and
!medicine furnished the defendant's wife and
child was a claim provable in bankruptcy, and
not within the provision of the Bankruptcy Act
exempting from the effect of discharge liabilities for maintenance and support of life and
minor children."
"In Schellenberg v. :Mullaney (1906) 112
App. Div. 384, 98 N.Y.S. 432, 16 Am. Bankr.
Rep. 542, it was held that § 17 of the Act of
1905, excepting "liabilities for alimony due to
or to become due or for maintenance or support
of wife and child" from discharge, referred only
to the involuntary liability under the common
law for support of wife and children, and to anyone who relieved their wants, but that it did not
refer to liability for goods purchased by a husband or parent and used by wife or child, and
that a debt for such goods was discharged by a
discharge in bankruptcy."
In the comprehensive 10 volume work Collier on
Bankruptcy, 14th Edition, Volume 1, page 1646, the
particular matters involved in the case now before the
court have been discussed:
"The above quoted portion of clause (2) applies to the common law liability involuntarily
imposed upon the parent for support of wife
or childY' ·
"It was intended to include liability where a
parent had failed or ref used to make a provision
for maintenance and such was furnished by another.4"
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"It does not include contracted liabilities for
goods purchased (although these be necessaries) 5 medical attendance furnished,6 or board
supplied7 by a parent for the use and benefit of
the wife or child.B"
Also in the more recent publication of Collier
Bankruptcy Manual, 2nd Edition, under Section 17,
page 212:
"With respect to maintenance or support, the
statute applies to the common-law liability involuntarily imposed upon the parent for the support of wife or child. "It was intended to include
liability where a parent had failed or refused
to make provision for maintenance and such was
furnished by another."4 It does not include contracted liabilities for goods purchased (although
these be necessaries), medical attendance furnished, or board supplied, by a parent for the
use and benefit of the wife or child.5"
This is further corroborated in 9 Am Jur 2d 793:
"It must be observed that this statutory exception to operation of a discharge applies only
to direct liabilities based upon, or substituted
for, legal support obligations. It does not refer
to, or include, liability for goods purchased by
a husband or parent and used by the wife or
child, and such liabilities remain dischargeable
in the bankruptcy of the husband or parent.3 .. "

"In a number of cases it has been held or recognized that a property settlement agreement
between spouses is dischargeable in bankruptcy,
at least where it is truly or substantially a property settlement agreement, and not an agreement for alimony, support, or maintenance.5"
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Many of the cases dealing with the question are not
in point. The principal case relied upon at trial by
Plaintiff-Respondent is Lyon vs. Lyon ( 1949) 115 Utah
466, 206 P.2d 148.
"That testimony was to the effect that prior
to the divorce the parties had jointly owned an
equity in a home in Indiana, but before the divorce that home was placed in the wife's name
alone; that at the time the written stipulation
was signed; it was understood between the parties that the $5,000 was for her support and maintenance, and the payments on the house mortgage were for the same purpose, and that the
insurance was to assure her at least $5,000 for
the same purpose ... All obligations "for maintenance or support of wife or child," whether
denominated alimony by the state statute or
note, are such as are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. It follows, therefore, that the real issue
in this case is not, as the parties have argued,
whether the award of the divorce decree was
alimony or a property settlement, but rather
whether the "property settlement" was really
an award for the support and maintenance of
the defendant's wife ... Thus, looking behind
the decree and the stipulation, the conclusion
seems inescapable under the authorities cited
that much of the property awarded, without regard to the order for payment of the mortgage
upon the home, or the judgment for $5000, or
the order for maintenance of the insurance protection, was 'in the nature of alimony,' and designed and contemplated by the parties to be
for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff.
"Such a conclusion is further supported by
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consideration of the years that the parties maintained the domestic relationship, by the fact that
she was a stenographer and self-sustaining before marriage, that she is now 56 years old and
thus practically unemployable in her profession,
and by her positive testimony that in the attorney's office at the time of drawing the stipulation the payments of money were referred to as
being for her support and maintenance, and by
the defendant's admission that support and
ma,intenance of th plaintiff was discussed there."
... The fact that the husband was to pay off
the mortgage on the home, that he was to pay
the alimony in gross in monthly installments of
$50, that he was to carry insurance on his own
life with his former wife as beneficiary, and
that she received nearly all of the household
furniture, all point to the idea of support. The
evidence adequately supports the findings and
holdings of the trial court . . .
The court in this case relied heavily upon the fact
that there had been 22 years of marriage, that the award
was made to pay $5,000 in installments directly to the
wife, that life insurance was to be carried on the life
of the defendant with the plaintiff as beneficiary and
the award of 15/16ths of the property directly to the
plaintiff wife.
The present case can be distinguished from the
Lyon case on numerous grounds.
(a) Divorce granted to Appellant against the Respondent imposing no automatic legal duty of support,
(b) Marriage for just over two years,
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( c) Testimony of Respondent that payments were
to reimburse her for funds she had at the time of marriage (TR p. 26 ( lines 14 to 22),
( d) Payments to be made to creditors not to Respondent,
( e) Was not a payment for support, but agreement to hold harmless,
( f) The nature of the obligations; siding, (TR p.
23, lines 19 to 28) , Encyclopedia and color television
(TR p. 24, lines 20 to 28) , and an automobile (TR
p. 25, lines 20 to 28).
Since Respondent has claimed that these obligations were to reimburse her for funds brought into the
marriage and loaned to or used in behalf of Appellant,
the 1950 cases of LaRue vs. LaRue, 341 Ill. App. 411,
93 N.E.2d 823, is almost directly in point. Sarah
LaRue brought a proceeding for a rule to show cause
why William LaRue should not be punished for contempt of Court in neglecting and refusing to comply
with an order in a divorce decree to pay plaintiff an
amount loaned by her to defendant. The trial court
found the defendant guilty in contempt and committed
him to jail until he purged himself thereof. The appeal
court reversed, saying:

"It is well settled that upon adjudication in
bankruptcy, title to all the bankrupt's property
vests in the trustee in bankruptcy as of the date
of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and the
bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction, pas-
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session and control of the estate of the bankrupt which cannot be affected by proceedings in
the State Court . . . Furthermore, where the
jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court has intervened, no state court can proceed with a pending suit to recover a dischargeable debt except
by permission of the bankruptcy court . . . .
Ordinary money payments directed to be made
by judgments or decrees are civil debts and
dischargeable in bankruptcy . . . A decree for
alimony is not an ordinary money decree and is
not regarded as a debt owing from a husband
to his wife, but rests on the natural and legal
duty. of the husband to support his wife and is
not discharged by an order of the bankruptcy
court ... In the instant case, the original divorce
decree found that appellant was indebted to
appellee for $1300 for money loaned by appellee
to appellant and ordered appellant to pay that
sum to appellee and created a lien upon any
real estate owned by appellant within this State
and directed a money judgment to be entered
for that amount. The J:!.ayment so directed was
for money loaned and did not arise as a result
of the marital relation of the parties. The obligation was a civil debt and not alimony and was
dischaI'geable in bankruptcy . . . Inasmuch,
however, as appellant had been adjudicated a
bankrupt prior to the time the instant petition
seeking to adjudge him in contempt was filed,
the contempt order issued by the City Court
was not proper. The order appealed from is
therefore reversed.
The Lyon case was decided in 1949 and thereafter
this court was faced with the more specific question inrnlved in the case now before the court, that is, whether
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the decree of a trial court ordering the husband to pay
obligations incurred during marriage is dischargeable
in bankruptcy.

Fife vs. Fife (1954) 1 Utah 2nd 281, 265 P.2d
'Gal, wherein the court said,

~.Y:Z

"The parties married in 1944 during the interlocutory period of defendant's previous divorce. Early in 1952, plaintiff was granted an
annulment of the marriage and was awarded
certain jointly-acquired property. At the same
time, defendant was ordered to pay designated
creditors having claims against the property.
He failed to pay and was cited to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt. On the
day before hearing, he filed bankruptcy schedules, listing, among other, the debts he had been
ordered to pay. Next day he was adjudicated a
bankrupt and made proof of such fact by certificate. Six months later on plaintiff's petition
which prayed only punishment for contempt,
he was again cited. He was not found in contempt, but the court entered judgment against
him and in favor of the plaintiff for the amount
she had been forced to pay the creditors in the
meantime."
"Defendant contends that his adjudication
gave the bankruptcy court jurisdiction over his
assets and liabilities; that any claim by plaintiff necessarily was adjudicable there, and that
the state court had no authority to enter the
judgment, subject to this appeal. Plaintiff reasons otherwise, urging that to deny such authority would emasculate a state court's power to
grant equitable relief simply by seeking sanctuary in bankruptcy; . . . It follows, and we
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hold, that the judgment entered after the adjudication evidenced a provable claim in bankruptcy,3 that it was "in esse" prior to the adjudication, not within the "exception to discharge" language of Sec. 17 of the Act, 11
U.S.C.A. § 35, 4 and not a claim of such nature
as not to be provable in bankruptcy,5 and consequently the state court was without authority
to enter such judgment ... Without deciding
the point, we can say that bankrupts frequently
and generally are relieved of obligations imposed by state courts ... Plaintiff had a remedy,
for what it might be worth, by resort to defendant's assets in the bankruptcy proceeding,
along with other creditors. To declare a preference for her under the facts of this case, where
a judgment came after, instead of before, and
when it could have come before, instead of
after the adjudication, - when it would have
b~en dischargeable, - would seem unrealistic,
unfair and circumventive of the unburdening
purpose of the bankruptcy act."
The court held that the obligation to pay creditors
was dischargeable in bankruptcy.
The annotation in 74 ALR 2d 758 reviews the dischargeability of property settlement agreements between spouses. It sets forth the general rule that property settlement agreements are dischargeable unless
such agreement is held to be in the nature of support
as in the Lyon case.
Cited therein in support of the general rule is
Tropp vs. Tropp (1933) 129 Ca. App. 62, 18 P.2d
385, wherein a case similar to the case now before the
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court, an agreement was entered into for the payment
of $250.00 per month for support and maintenance
until remarriage and a $50,000.00 property settlement
to be made in monthly payments. The court held that
though the support payments were non dischargeable
in bankruptcy, the $50,000.00 payment constituted a
debt incurred in effecting a property settlement and '
was dischargeable. '!'his is to be analogized to the
case now before the court where support payments were
established by the agreement of the parties at $100.00
per month pending the reinstatement of social security
payments and the obligation of the payment of the
three named creditors was to reimburse the DefendantRespondent for money she brought into the marriage.
Also in Goggans vs. Osborn (1956, CA9 Alaska)
237 F2d 186, where the court held a property settlement dischargeable in bankruptcy, and the principal
case on which the annotation is founded, Smalley vs.
Smalley (1959) 176 Cal App 2d (Adv 402), 1 Cal
Rptr 440, 74 ALR 2d 756, wherein the court held that
the parties agreement to settle property rights in lieu
of alimony, and where alimony had been waived in
consideration of the agreement for the property settlement was nevertheless dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Also the annotator draws reference to Fernandes
vs. Pitta (1941) 47 Cal App. 2d 248, 117 P.2d 728,
where a wife had obtained a judgment on four unpaid
notes and the court therein said that though the subject
of maintenance and support was incidentally mentioned
in the contract, that the notes were given for the pur-
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pose of settling the rights of property and support
between the parties and were held to be dischargeable
in bankruptcy, distinguishing the case of Remondino
vs. Remondino case cited for the proposition that certain
support obligations are not dischargeable.
Attention is also drawn to the case Stoutenberg
vs. Stoutenberg, 285 Mich. 505, 281 N.W. 305, wherein
a decree ordering the husband to clear the obligation
on the mortgage on a home was held to be dischargeable
in bankruptcy.
The testimony of the Plaintiff-Respondent that
the obligations assumed were to provide reimbursement
to her of funds held prior to marriage, the nature of
the particular debts involved, and the fact that the
divorce was awarded to the Appellant hereunder,
viewed in the light of the case and textual citations set
forth herein all amply demonstrate that the payments
were not for the support and maintenance of the Respondent and was a dischargeable debt under the Bankrupcty Act.
POINT II
THE OBLIGATIONS SUED UPON BY
THE RESPONDENT 'VERE CONTRACTUAL
IN NATURE AND THE COURT ERRED
\VHEN IT FOUND THAT SUCH OBLIGA~
TIONS WERE FOR SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE RESPONDENT. THAT
SUCH OBLIGATIONS WERE DISCHARGED
BY THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.
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Examination of the file in Civil X o. 28806 received
in evidence (TR 47, lines 25 to 30 and p. 48 lines 1
and 2) discloses that your Appellant herein was awarded the decree of diYorce from Respondent. The Court
founded the grounds upon cruelty of the Respondent.
The court then found the stipulation of the parties to
be reasonable and approved the same. The court did not
make an order with respect to the matters set forth in
the stipulation but merely approved it.
It is also drawn to the court's attention that this
action was not brought under the contempt powers of
the court in the diYorce matter but was commenced
as a separate matter pleading the stipulation and agreement of the parties and asking for a money judgment.
The Respondent herself by her proceeding considered
this to be in the nature of a contractual obligation.

A similar circumstance was presented to the court
in Wintrode t·s. Connors ( 1941) 67 Ohio App. 106, 46
Am. B.R. (N.S.) 751, 35 X.E. 2d 1018.
This was an action founded on a contract between
the plaintiff and the defendant whereby the plaintiff
agreed to furnish support and care for the minor child
of the defendant at the rate of $1.00 per day. Thereafter, defendant filed a >oluntary petition in bank·
ruptcy and plaintiff brought suit upon the claim. In
handing down its ruling the court said at page 1020:
·• ( 1) It is significant that since the amendment of the Bankruptcy Act in 1903. the courts
have, without deYiation or dissent. interpreted
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that part of the section referred to in this case
as including only such liability as is imposed by
law and not such as is created by contract. In
this we think the legislative intent and purpose
in passing the amendment has been correctly
interpreted. Contract liabilities have always
been discharged in bankruptcy, while it has always been the policy of the Bankruptcy Act
to refuse the right of discharge from debts created through certain actionable wrongs."
The court thereupon went on to rule that the
finding of the lower court that the debt upon which
the action was founded in the case before the court
was discharged in bankruptcy was correct as being
founded upon the contractual agreement of the parties.
The question here is not whether Appellant has
complied with an order of the equity court in the divorce
matter, but whether his agreement entered into in conjunction with a divorce proceeding is dischargeable
under the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
Under the discretionary powers of the equity court,
where as here the Decree of Divorce was awarded to
Appellant upon a finding against the Respondent, the
court was not obliged to make any award for support.
The stipulation was a contractual agreement between the parties. It recited that the Appellant would
pay the obligation to First Federal Savings and Loan
Association for siding placed upon the residence of
Respondent (TR p. 23), lines 19 to 28): the obligation
to City Finance Company of Murray, for an encyclo-

21

pedia and color television (TR p. 24, lines 20 to 28) ;
and the obligation to Zions First National Bank on
a Valiant automobile (TR p. 25, lines 20 to 28) all
for items not in the nature of support, but only as testified to by Respondent and as itemized in the letter
of September 2, 1965 (Exhibit 5-D) for reimbursement of funds of the Respondent prior to her marriage
to Appellant.
CONCLUSION
Appellant asserts to the court that in the circumstances presented by this case, i.e., a divorce granted
to the husband, agreement and stipulation of the parties
that the husband will pay certain obligations to creditors
as a return of funds the wife brought to the marriage,
stipulation providing for payment of support of $100.00
per month until reinstatement of social security, only
two years of marriage, and the nature of the obligations
assumed by the husband; the claim of the wife was a
debt dischargeable in bankruptcy. Appellant respectfully urges that the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
M. DAYLE JEFFS
For JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys for Appellant
227 North University
Provo, Utah
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